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The Design of Alterna-
tives in Organizational
Contexts: A Pilot Study
Ernest R. Alexander
A review of decision research suggests that the design
stage is a neglected aspect of the decision-making pro-
cess. This study develops a conceptual model for analyz-
ing the design of alternatives in organizations, and
applies it in three case studies. The model has two basic
dimensions which nnay affect the range and quality of
options generated in the design process. One is the mix
and type of creativity and search; the other is the degree
and type of closure to other phases of decision making.
Comparative analysis of the cases offers qualified sup-
port for the hypotheses, and clear evidence that the im-
pact of alternatives design on decision outcomes war-
rants greater attention to this stage of the decision-
making process.*
The author is grateful to the Technion-
Israel Institute of Technology for its sup-
port. This paper has also gained from the
constructive criticism of earlier drafts by
Professor Aaron Wildavsky and ASQ re-
viewers, to whom thanks are due for
their efforts but no blame for any errors,
which remain the author's responsibility.
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See, among others, Bross (1953: 18-23);
Simon (1960; 1-4); Dyckman (1961);
Ouade(1967: 1-16); Mack (1971: 71,
175-249); Zaitman, Duncan, and Holbeck
(1973: 53-58).
Individuals, groups, or organizations make rational decisions
in a sequence of stages. The first stage is the perception of
a need for a decision — the sense of a problem and the
definition of a shortfall from a desired state. The identifica-
tion of such a desired state may involve a process of goal
articulation. The problem-solving process then begins with
the development of alternatives, continues with their evalua-
tion, and, through the application of decision criteria related
to the individual's or organization's goals, ends with the
choice and implementation of the preferred action.••
The stages of problem perception and goal articulation have
been studied extensively and are described in a wide litera-
ture ranging through cognitive psychology, sociology, and
organization theory. Normatively, these stages are covered
in the organizational development literature and analytic de-
cision theory. The process of evaluation, acceptance, and
implementation or diffusion of solutions is also described in
studies dealing with organizational innovation, and a range of
evaluation techniques and applications have been developed
in economics, decision theory, operations research, and
management.
When it comes to developing the alternative solutions which
are to be evaluated, we discover a surprising gap. Nearly
fifteen years ago Feldman and Kanter (1965: 620) noted:
Most research on decision making has ignored the problems in-
volved in generating alternatives. The major interest has been on
procedures for selecting the best alternative from all those pre-
sented (on the assumption that all alternatives have been pre-
sented).
Up to the present, even extensive descriptions of the deci-
sion process take this stage for granted, and pass over it in
a sentence or two (Marschak, 1968: 42-43; Mack, 1971:
17, 119; Wendt, 1970; Zaitman, Duncan, and Holbeck,
1973: 4).
How are alternatives identified? This stage of the decision
process is actually a form of design, in the sense used by
Simon: "Everyone designs who devises courses of action
aimed at changing existing situations into preferred ones"
(1969: 55). How does the design process take place in or-
ganizational contexts, and how does it affect decisions and
their outcomes?
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The importance of relating descriptive
and normative answers to these ques-
tions becomes apparent if we recall the
debate — beginning in the mid-1950s
and still current — between proponents
of the "rational" planning and decision
approach, and the proponents of "satis-
ficing" and "incrementalism," The
former began with an abstract view and
tried to mold reality to its precepts —
with limited success. The latter pro-
ceeded from a positivistic approach, and
remained content to accept a limited real-
ity as the only possible norm. An earlier
integration of the positive and the norma-
tive views could have avoided this sterile
dichotomy.
The answers to these questions are linked to some norma-
tive issues which are important for effective planning and
management (Dror, 1971: 55). If planners, administrators,
and managers are being equipped today with tools and
techniques for articulating goals and evaluating projects and
programs, how should they develop those alternative solu-
tions which they are to evaluate, and choose one for im-
plementation? Are there any normative techniques for sys-
tematically designing alternative solutions in a given situa-
tion? If there are, how appropriate are they in the light of
actual behavior and perceived constraints in real environ-
ments?2 How crucial these questions are is clear when we
realize that the best evaluation techniques can only be
applied to those alternatives which are given. Therefore, the
quality of the options which are developed for evaluation is
a necessary — though not a sufficient — condition for a
good decision.
THE GENESIS OF ALTERNATIVES — THEORY
A review of models and descriptions of the alternatives-
design process suggests two main dimensions of analysis —
one relating to the nature of the process and the other to its
form. The first dimension raises the question of whether
alternatives are created or found. The second one addresses
the degree of closure of the design phase. Both issues
have important normative implications.
Search or Creation?
The question of how alternatives are generated has a bear-
ing on the adoption of normative methods. Should they en-
hance creativity like "brainstorming," though this possibility
has been called into doubt philosophically (Hausman, 1975)
and its utility questioned empirically (Taylor, Bern/, and Black,
1958)? Or should the emphasis be on developing techniques
for systematic search and reducing complexity? Some pos-
sible answers are offered by sources in a number of differ-
ent disciplines which include studies dealing with the deci-
sion process and problem solving by individuals, groups, and
organizations. For the individual, Marr (1973: 60-92) reviews
numerous studies in the area of cognitive psychology which
explore the effect of creativity on problem solving abilities.
Another approach, best typified by Newell and Simon (1972),
sees problem solving as a search process with the problem
solver involved in a complex information-processing task,
which can only be mastered with the aid of simplifying
heuristics. Simon (1957, 1960) has extended his findings on
the problem-solving process from individuals to organiza-
tions. He described a limited search for alternatives which
stops when an option is found which meets a minimal aspi-
ration level — an approach which he has called
"satisficing."
On the organizational level, the question of how alternatives
are developed has also been addressed. One group of deci-
sion theorists headed by Lindblom (1959: 59-88; 1967)
sees the development of alternatives as an incremental
modification of preceding and existing options — again a
limited search process (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963).
Cyert and March identified what they called "problemistic
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search." Here organizations' scanning and perceptions of
available options are motivated by the views of the problem
prevailing in the organization, biased by the specialized orien-
tations of participants, and guided by their hopes and expec-
tations from the organizational environment. Search is
heuristic, following simple intuitive rules (Cyert and March,
1963: 44-66,79, 120-122). The existence of a "pro-
grammed" search for alternatives in organizations with a
need for routinized solutions to recurring problems has also
been suggested (March and Simon, 1958; Simon, 1960); a
reverse search process, too, of solutions looking for prob-
lems, may be taking place (Cohen, March, and Olson, 1972:
1-25).
Finally, the descriptive approach to the development of al-
ternatives includes some of the studies of organizational in-
novation, which are fully reviewed in Zaitman, Duncan, and
Holbeck (1973). Here again, one is left with a sense that the
solutions to problems are already there, and that the
problem-solving process is a search ending in the discovery
of a feasible — this time innovative, rather than prece-
dented — alternative. This literature concentrates on the fac-
tors in organizations and their environments which affect
the development of innovations, and on analysis of all the
stages of the innovation process. The stage at which alter-
natives are generated is dealt with only in passing.
Annong these sources we may distinguish between two
views of the alternatives-generation process. The first sees
the development of alternatives as a process of search and
discovery: the solution to the problem is there, and it only
needs to be identified by processing the relevant information
or by discovering and perhaps recombining its preexisting
constituent parts. This approach fills most of the descriptive
and some of the normative organizational literature, and is
shared by some studies in creativity in cognitive (especially
associational) psychology.
The second view sees the development of alternatives as a
process of design or creation to a significant extent ex
nihilo; solutions do not preexist but have to be generated by
conceiving, designing, or creating new ideas, processes, or
products. Some of the creativity literature implies this view,
especially that which is gestalt-oriented (Wertheimer, 1945),
while other accounts of creativity tend more to emphasize
its associational aspects (Koestler, 1964).
But there is no reason why these views have to be nnutually
exclusive. The creative process appears to be a blend of
invention and discovery (or adoption), the proportions of
which might vary with the characteristics of the problem
and the decision environment. The associational approach to
creativity offers such a link between insight and search
(Rothenburg and Hausman, 1976: 149-153, 161-165), a
blend also implied in some of design methods which involve
complexity-reducing processes which are also a method of
systematic search through a problem space (Alexander,
1964; Jones, 1970). The nature of this blend should be of
interest, however, since an association between creativity
and innovation is often inferred (Crosby, 1968), and there
seems to be some relation between the directions of search
and the quality of decisions (Marquis, 1969).
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Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret
(1967: 255) suggest a roughly analogous
division: "memory search," "passive
search," "trap search," and "active
search."
To facilitate analysis of the mix between creativity and
search in designing alternatives, we might envisage them as
two dimensions of a multidimensional process. An effective
creative process would combine high levels of both creativ-
ity and search, where the latter might range from formal
systematic search, through informal or heuristic search,
down to passive search based mainly on participants'
memories and experience.^
Freedom or Constraint?
The degree to which the design of alternatives is inhibited
also affects the quality of outcomes. The "rational" model
demands an exhaustive development of options (Schoeffler,
1954), a requirement which clearly cannot be met (Simon,
1957). Indeed, some limits are indispensable: Simon (1964)
identifies these as constraints on the generation of alterna-
tives, which enable the synthesis of viable solutions, and
"alternatives' testing," ensuring that the options to be eval-
uated are feasible.
Perceived limits of knowledge, time, and resources may
constrain alternatives design, tending to elicit a narrow range
of options differing only marginally from known precedents
(Lindblom, 1967). The exercise of power may be another
type of constraint, limiting the range of options by setting
the decision agenda (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). Constrain-
ing the development of alternatives may be a prevalent and
effective form of "non-decision" making: this may become
manifest in covert conflict, or even in the maintenance of a
consensus which makes certain options "unthinkable"
(Lukes, 1974: 21-24). Such a consensus may not only be
the product of preconditioning, but also the result of manipu-
lation of information as a power resource (Pettigrew, 1973:
233-240, 275).
Another source of constraints on the design of alternatives
is the relation between the design phase and the adjacent
stages of the decision-making process: problem definition
and evaluation. The rational decision-making model envis-
ages a distinct phase of the alternatives' development, inti-
mately related to preceding problem or goal definition, and
clearly separated from a succeeding stage of formal evalua-
tion and selection. The degree of interaction across these
interfaces will here be called closure: high closure suggests
limited or no interaction while low closure implies intensive
interaction and feedback.
Prescriptive theory suggests that the greatest openness for
the uninhibited design of alternatives is offered by the "ra-
tional" approach, where goal or problem definition interacts
with design but judgment is deferred. We may hypothesize,
therefore, that as types and degrees of closure diverge from
this ideal, the design of an optimal alternative and the ratio-
nal evaluation of options will be preempted by perceptual or
political factors. But the implications of different types and
degrees of closure must be addressed separately on the
interface between design and goal-problem articulation and
on the interface between design and evaluation because
closure has opposite normative implications for each.
Low closure between design and problem identification or
goal setting has positive associations, permitting the fruitful
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Of course, evaluation criteria must be
considered in the fornn in which alterna-
tives are presented and the dimensions
they take into account (Lichfield, Kettle,
and Whitbread, 1975: 33-35),
interaction between ends and means. Some closure is nec-
essary to establish a framework for the synthesis of op-
tions, but too much closure, such as rigidly predetermined
goals or a problem diagnosis locked in by organizational or
disciplinary predilections, may inhibit the emergence of po-
tentially optimal alternatives.
Available evidence suggests that there is a good deal of
closure between design and problem definition. One source
of such closure may be when problems are defined in one
institution and plans or policies are made in another (Rittel,
1967: 1/18). Perceptual filters (Rittel and Webber, 1973)
threaten another type of closure. Often theoretical
paradigms or institutional ideologies define a problem in
such a way as to predetermine the type and range of op-
tions that will be considered (Warren, 1971). Disciplinary
biases and even personal propensities may preempt an in-
vestigator's or decision maker's vision, even in such osten-
sibly objective areas as the physical sciences (Mitroff, 1974).
On the design-evaluation interface, on the other hand, high
closure is associated with suspension of judgment, which is
good. Low closure implies a premature leakage of evaluation
into the design phase, preempting or eliminating possibly
valuable options.* But interaction, rather than closure, be-
tween design and evaluation has been noted in one of the
few systematic empirical analyses we have of complex de-
cision processes (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret, 1976:
257). Several systematic planning efforts described by
Lichfield, Kettle, and Whitbread also used an iterative and
progressively more detailed development and evaluation ap-
proach, an approach which these authors recommend
(1973: 287-288,294-298).
The normative combination of factors suggested by the ra-
tional model leads us to expect the most uninhibited devel-











Figure 1: Closure and alternatives design.
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preceding phase of goals-problems articulation is at its low-
est, and closure to the following evaluation stage is highest.
To test these propositions, we want to examine the rela-
tionship between various types of design and the combina-
tions of closure described above, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Four design categories may be identified on a continuum
made up of combinations of these variables. The first of
these, A is the ideal "rational" approach, involving the free
and uninhibited generation of options with feedback linkage
to incorporate a variety of problem definitions, and closure to
the evaluation stage to avoid premature elimination. The
second, B, is the generation of alternatives, "limited" by any
combination of problem definitions, goal articulations, and
real or perceived constraints. The third category, C, involves
preformal alternatives' elimination, where an informal evalua-
tion process selects out the options to be forwarded for
formal evaluation. The final category, D, is an integrated and
iterative alternatives-design and evaluation process.
Alternatives and Outcomes
Observations linking the design process with decision out-
comes are sparse. It may be inferred that "created" designs
would be more innovative than "found" ones, and much of
the impetus for research into creativity rests on this as-
sumption. The type of search undertaken has been linked
with the number of alternatives generated: heuristic search
and scanning will tend to elicit a limited number of familiar
options, while systematic search should yield a much wider
range of options (Rittel, 1970: 19-20).
Lindblom is one pragmatic observer who has linked the
alternatives-design process with the resulting range of op-
tions, but his "disjointed incrementalism" explicitly excludes
unprecedented situations and novel problems (Lindblom,
1967: 36-37), and its necessary result in certain types of
outcomes is still under question (Bailey and O'Connor, 1975).
Steinbruner (1974: 107-109) suggests that in many complex
decision processes only one alternative at a time is actually
elaborated to the point of evaluation. But this may under-
state the process of preformal alternatives genesis and
elimination, a process which observations indicate precedes
this outcome (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret, 1976:
256).
The evidence reviewed here is not extensive, and it offers
only tentative conclusions to some of the questions raised
above. In view of the critical role of design in the decision-
making process, a more systematic examination of the pro-
cess that generates alternatives seems called for. Such an
examination, however, is only possible with a more formal
articulation of the design process than has been attempted
to date.
The design process can be described by a combination of
several dimensions: (1) the mix and quality of creativity and
search, and (2) the type and degree of closure. A matrix of
possible combinations along these two dimensions allows us
to ask what the relations are between these factors and the
results of the alternatives-design process — the characteris-
tics of the solutions which are identified and chosen for
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The number of alternatives might be
subdivided into the number of solutions
first identified, and then the number of
alternatives actually chosen for evalua-
tion If we assume that the altematives-
generation process is not hermetically
sealed off from the evaluation stage, but
that it may incorporate in itself a prelimi-
nary informal selection process, then
these numbers will differ significantly.
evaluation. In particular, how do the nature, form, and envi-
ronment of the design process affect the number,* diversity,
and innovativeness of alternatives. These characteristics
must be assessed, of course, in relation to the organization
or unit being analyzed. A radically novel solution in one field
may be commonplace in another; this is typical, for exam-
ple, of many technology transfers (Schon, 1967: 8-11,
16-18, 161-164).
The types of options which are developed may also depend
on the source of ideas, or models which may also affect
problem definition, and be a repertoire of available solutions.
Such models can include extraorganizational experience or
applications, and theoretical knowledge (Pounds, 1969: 1 1 -
17), or they can enable the design of alternatives using or
modifying given (often unique) or ready-made solutions
(Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret, 1976: 249, 251).
Appropriate evaluative data on the effects and impacts of
decisions could also allow an assessment of how
alternatives-design and its environment relate to the feasibil-
ity and effectiveness of the options finally chosen and im-
plemented. This is only possible, of course, when sufficient
time has passed to enable a reasonable evaluation of the
impact of alternatives which were adopted, and some per-
spective to speculate on what the impact of different op-
tions might have been. This is difficult to do, but it is the
only type of analysis that enables descriptive findings to
infer normative conclusions with some claim to validity.
To show how such an inquiry might be operationalized, a
pilot study is presented below. Its analysis is structured
around these questions, but the conclusions cannot be gen-
eralized beyond these particular instances. At best, analogies
may be inferred to similar circumstances or types of organi-
zations, but valid generalizations must await an accumulation
of comparable studies large enough to constitute a satisfac-
tory sample.
THREE CASES
This study presents three cases of alternatives generation in
organizational contexts. The cases were not chosen a priori
to explore the suggested taxonomy of alternatives design; in
fact, the taxonomy emerged to test questions raised by the
cases. They were chosen to display as wide a range of
variation as possible while still exhibiting the minimal charac-
teristics of the design process: the deliberate identification
of a number of options, and the selection of some of them
for systematic evaluation.
The choice of cases was limited by the need for descrip-
tions which document the alternatives-design process in de-
tail, so that abstraction would not project a spurious image
of rationality. Consequently, these cases exhibit the bias
which, according to March and Romelaer (1976: 251), per-
vades traditional studies of decision making: the decisions
had high salience for their participants, and usually took
place within a well-structured organizational context. The
first case is the development of Vietnam policy in the higher
echelons of the U.S. national security establishment. The
second case is the choice of a site for the third London
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Airport by a Parliamentary Commission. The third case in-
volved a University of Wisconsin task force.*
These cases all deal with the kind of high-level staffwork
backed issues which display a systematic development of
alternatives and are of enough general interest to warrant
their documentation. This is the natural result of the need
for adequately described cases. But these cases are not
necessarily different from lower-level decisions such as the
selection of an appropriate garbage disposal technology by a
town council, or a community health agency's decision on
an optimal drug abuse prevention program. It is possible that
the only difference is that cases like the latter are lost in the
mists of obscurity.
Finally, a word on the case descriptions. Each of these
episodes unfolds within a political context which is no less
innportant than the decision process of which it is an integral
part. The descriptions often allude to the political aspects of
decisions and outcomes, but that is not their focus. The
outcomes in these cases, we believe, are more the results
of the decision process itself than of political considerations
or relationships. Where this is not so, explicit reference is
made to the political factors that affected the decisions or
their outcomes.
6
While this episode took place in one of
the educational institutions where organi-
zational ambiguity prevails (March and
Olsen, 1976: 8), it, too, took place in a
well-defined system of intraorganizational
relationships, though we shall see some
of the traits of the "organized anarchy"
which universities are.
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The main sources for this case, where
not stated otherwise, are the Pentagon
Papers (1971a: 11—40-68, 102-103,
108-115, 160-162, 165, 241,443-445,
447; 111 — 210,220-231,237,246-247;
IV — 22-23, 87-91, 262-263, 265-269;
1971b: 102-103, 174. 202, 325, 365,
374, 433, 440, 450-452, 598-604). It has
been claimed that considerations not re-
flected in the internal debates described
in the Pentagon Papers affected the ul-
timate strategy choices (Ullman, 1971;
Ellsberg, 1972; 74-76; Gelb, 1972). But
the consistency between the published
accounts and the policy outputs has not
been questioned, and for our purpose the
Pentagon Papers offer an unusually rich
and detailed source.
CASE I: NATIONAL SECURITY: U.S. VIETNAM POLICY,
1961-1968
In the spring of 1961 a task force developed two proposals
addressing the problenn of increased Vietcong infiltration in
South Vietnann. One reconnnnended an increase in South
Vietnannese forces (ARVN), the other suggested a U.S. troop
connnnitment. The final draft incorporated both ideas, but
changed the rationale: now U.S. troops were to train the
Vietnamese, and the expanded ARVN were to meet an inva-
sion threat, not infiltration. While the troop commitment de-
cision was still deferred, the American advisory buildup sim-
ply increased from 685 to 2,285.^
In the face of a continually deteriorating situation, the Presi-
dent sent General Maxwell Taylor, his military advisor, to
evaluate alternative courses of action on the scene, while
the Pentagon was conducting another of its own evalua-
tions. In the Pentagon's analysis of November 7, the alterna-
tives were:
A. An American airlift to Vietnam and increased U.S. logistics sup-
port; the introduction of advisors in the ARVN down to battalion
level;
B. The 'Taylor Plan," which involved the introduction of 8,000-
10,000 U.S. troops consisting of engineers with some combat sup-
port, into the Mekong Delta;
C. The commitment of 25,000-40,000 U.S. troops, to engage in
ground, sea, and air operations against the Viet Cong;
D. A threat of bombing North Vietnam, combined with options A,
B, orC.
All these options were marginally different versions of an
escalation strategy. The most radically different policy was
the "threat" of bombing North Vietnam. The Pentagon's
recommendations, proposing a military commitment in sup-
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port of Vietnam, were almost inevitable given the narrow
range of alternatives. The administration, however, avoided
the proposed commitment, choosing only to initiate another
increase in aid to ARVN and the first escalation in U.S. mili-
tary "advisory" personnel that exceeded the Geneva Accord
ceilings (Pentagon Papers, 1971a: II, 108-116).
From late 1961 to early 1963, various versions of neutraliza-
tion were proposed by U.S. Ambassador to India, Chester
Bowles, Senator Mike Mansfield, and General Charles De
Gaulle, but were dismissed by Washington. A fundamental
reappraisal of U.S. relations with communism would have
been called for, of which the Kennedy administration was
not capable. Domestic political considerations, too, precluded
a turnabout of this scale (Kalb and Abel, 1971: 178). Presi-
dent Johnson continued his predecessor's policy, but after
his own election he initiated an intensive policy review. Lim-
ited withdrawal into "enclaves," phased withdrawal, and
neutralization were all suggested but rejected as inconsistent
with basic U.S. geopolitical goals.
This rejection of "fallback" positions, before they were fully
explored, occurred again in late 1964 when a National Secu-
rity Council (NSC) working group was set up in response to
the Vietcong attack on a U.S. airbase at Bienhoa. This group
evaluated a limited and clustered set of options:
A. More of the same;
B. Escalate military pressure against North Vietnam, and resist
feelers for negotiations except simultaneously with continued
bombing ("full squeeze");
C. Option A plus mild pressures against North Vietnam and a de-
clared willingness to negotiate.
As the situation grew more critical and an increased sense
of constraint prevailed, these options converged in the fol-
lowing alternatives:
A. More of the same and limited pressure on the North; continu-
ing rejection of negotiations;
B. Option A plus increasing militan/ pressure on North Vietnam —
a public position of total inflexibility on negotiations, but a private
recognition of their eventual inevitability ("full squeeze");
C. Option A plus graduated moves against military targets in the
North ("graduated squeeze") including indicating a willingness to
bargain with North Vietnam.
These strategies were all oriented to improve the American
posture in eventual negotiations, and to "buy time." A con-
sensus in favor of Option C was based on the assumption
that the loss of Vietnam would be more serious than NSC
estimates indicated. Finally, the recommendation of Option
A, reinforced by the lowest order actions in Option C, was
implemented as administration policy.
However, the failure of this policy to retrieve the situation
led to a new "trilemma": Massive air strikes against North
Vietnam ran the risk of nuclear escalation; a large U.S. troop
commitment raised the spectre of a new Asian war; and
negotiations evoked an image of national humiliation. The
analysis is developed to its logical conclusions:
If the DRV will not "play" the above game, we must be prepared
(a) to risk passing some flash points . . . (b) to put more troops into
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South Vietnam and/or (c) to reconsider our minimum acceptable
outcome. (McNaughton, 1965)
Both (a) and (c) were too radical to enjoy serious considera-
tion. Consequently the predictable result was the "decision
to proceed very slowly with ground force involvement."
(Pentagon Papers 1971a: II, 448)
A memo from Under Secretary of State George Ball, in July
1965, was the first instance of serious evaluation of a radical
alternative to incremental escalation by one of the policy
"establishment" (Ball, 1965). Meanwhile, the Secretary of
State continued to present the conventional view that in-
cremental escalation, even to the point of hazarding a full-
scale war, was still the least risk policy (Pentagon Papers,
1971a: tV, 23).
The next review was sparked by a new Vietnam crisis. On
April 9, 1967, Washington's top decision makers generated
four options for analysis:
A. More of the same;
B. Combining Option A pressure with pressures for compromise
under an optimistic appraisal of the chances of success;
C, Option B, but with a pessimistic slant;
D, Ball's proposal for disengagement.
These options were narrowed to three:
A, Continue as before, in the hope that the setback is only
temporary;
B, Ditto, but move more actively to stimulate a negotiated solution;
C, Disengagement (Pentagon Papers, 1971a: 82-91),
The result was a recommendation of Option A, since Option
B was unstable, shading into the first if an optimistic view
were taken, while with a pessimistic appraisal it began to
look like Option C. Given the "establishment's" commitment
to the domino theory, which was restated with this recom-
mendation. Option C was never seriously evaluated (Dono-
van, 1970: 102).
It is striking how few, and how similar, the options were
which emerged from the review process at its various itera-
tions. These three or four alternatives were the result of a
convergence of views, after non-consensual proposals were
eliminated or ignored. Clearly the informal review process
was highly constrained by the dominant and universally ac-
cepted organizational paradigm of the "domino theory." As a
result, the policy establishment repeatedly closed ranks
against ideas suggested by what they perceived as a hostile
environment, or proposed by establishment mavericks.
The development of alternatives and their informal review
also provided an arena for the same relatively uninhibited
input of organizational considerations and domestic and bu-
reaucratic politics noted by Allison (1969: 698-718) in the
context of the Cuban missile crisis. His "organizational pro-
cess" model explains the persistence of incremental escala-
tion proposals through repeated Pentagon and NSC policy
reviews. His "bureaucratic politics paradigm" may also ac-
count for the early elimination of neutralization and with-
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drawal proposals. Such alternatives did not respond to the
convergence of military establishment interests and domes-
tic political considerations (Gelb, 1971) as the escalation
options did.*
8
The refusal to consider formally any
non-escalation alternatives also persisted
long after a CIA evaluation of the
"domino theory" in 1963 exploded its va-
lidity in terms of realistic U.S. geopolitical
interests (Pentagon Papers, 1971b: 126).
It is impossible to estimate which moti-
vations were stronger, political or
paradigmatic, when Bundy could note in
1967: "An articulate minority . . . may not
believe in . . . the domino theory, but
most Americans (along with nearly all
Asians) know better." (Pentagon Papers,
1971a: IV, 159).
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This case study is based on Perman
(1973) for the background leading up to
the establishment of the Roskill Com-
mission, and on McKle (1973) for the
Commission's terms of reference, its ac-
tivities and hearings, and the outcome of
its recommendations. Lichfield, Kettle,
and Whitbread (1975: 271-289) is the
source of additional detail on the Com-
mission's development and analysis of al-
ternatives between June 1968 and De-
cember 1970.
CASE II: A THIRD LONDON AIRPORT: THE ROSKILL
COMMISSION
The problem of serving the projected increases in London's
air traffic first arose in the context of national air transporta-
tion planning in the late 1950s. A series of inquiries through
the 1960s led to the choice of Stanstead, a small existing
airport to the northeast of London, as the site for London's
third major airport.®
Stanstead was a controversial choice and failed to win nec-
essary support. In May 1968 a Commission of Enquiry
named for its chairman. Sir Eustace Roskill, was appointed:
To enquire into the timing of the need for a four-runway airport to
cater for the growth of traffic at existing airports serving the Lon-
don area, to consider the various alternative sites, and to recom-
mend which site should be selected. (McKie, 1973: 167)
Focusing on the site selection process, the Commission de-
cided to apply an extensive cost-benefit analysis to evaluate
a short list of selected alternatives.
The generation of this "short list" was recognized as an
important part of the decision process, and indeed engaged
the best part of the Commission's work. This process took
place in four stages. First, 78 "coarse" alternative airport
sites were identified, chosen so that the range of locational
options should be as wide as possible within a defined
overall search area.
The next stage involved reducing the list from 78 to 29,
according to three broad criteria: surface access, defense,
and noise. The staff also used its "judgment" in applying
other planning-oriented criteria, though little factual informa-
tion on possible impacts was available at this stage.
The criteria used to eliminate alternatives were chosen be-
cause they were important, and because they were easy to
quantify. This was not the case with respect to the other
planning considerations, though their importance was recog-
nized and their assessment later became the largest item in
the Commission's research budget.
At the end of this round, 29 sites were left, which were
subjected to more detailed cost studies on surface access,
defense, air traffic control, site preparation, and noise. The
greatest difference among sites was in surface access
costs, but these rested on some critical assumptions. One
was the distribution of preferred modes of travel: bus, train,
or private automobile, to enable the use of a gravity model
for allocating passenger journeys to airports by mode. The
other was the imputed value of passengers' travel time.
Both later proved to be controversial and were hotly con-
tested in the hearings.
These studies led to another round of elimination, resulting
in a "reduced medium list" of 15. The Commission finally




The dissenting commissioner issued a
minority report of his own, although the
majority on the Commission thought he
had been coopted with the inclusion of
Foulness in the short list. He took issue
with the Commission's priorities, and
proposed the Foulness location on the
basis of its much smaller environmental
impact.
at Exeter College in December 1968. Not surprisingly the
five highest ranked sites were in the Northwest, which had
the best access, since accessibility was the most easily
quantified indicator and remained the most heavily weighted
criterion.
The final "short list" of five options included four of these
sites, and Foulness, a coastal site, which was retained as a
result of pressure from a commission member. This com-
missioner was not persuaded that the cost factors out-
weighed less tangible ecological and social impact consid-
erations, and had the stature, ability, and willingness to
mobilize informed public opinion in his support. They there-
fore retained Foulness under consideration right into the
final stage. The Commission also believed that Foulness
might offer as yet unquantified advantages on "regional
planning grounds," and kept this option to provide a basis of
comparison with the four inland sites.
Hearings near each of these sites revealed that opposition
of local residents was least at Foulness. Nevertheless, on
the basis of its cost-benefit evaluations, the Commission
recommeded Cublington, one of the inland sites.""^ The gov-
ernment overturned this selection on a number of consid-
erations. Primary among these was the well-organized politi-
cal opposition to the implementation of the Commission's
recommendations, with the Commission's own lack of
unanimity also carrying considerable weight.
Lichfield, Kettle, and Whitbread (1975: 288) ascribe the
Commission's ultimate failure to a premature closure of op-
tions, noting that already at the first cycle of elimination the
Commission was focusing on a narrow band of locations in
the north and northeast. The Commission was also attacked
for neglecting that part of its charge which was to address
the timing and need for a four-runway airport. The reas-
sessment of these factors has had the greatest impact on
the outcome, leading to the ultimate suspension of the
project.
CASE III: HIGHER EDUCATION RETRENCHMENT: THE
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN SYSTEM
In 1975 , after the University of Wisconsin System had ex-
perienced several years of budgetary exigencies (Epstein,
1974: 45-46), the Governor asked the system administra-
tion to submit its long-run plan for adapting to the prospect
of declining enrollments. In response, the University set up
the System Advisor/ Planning Task Force (SATPF), struc-
tured into four Study Committees. Three of them were
charged with analyzing the impacts of alternative "phase
down" or "phase out" options. The fourth was charged
with developing other, non-phase down, phase out options,
and was told:
. . . this Comnnittee has the opportunity to invent planning alterna-
tives . . ., its charge is inherently nnore flexible than that of the
other Study Comnnittees. (SAPTF, 1975: B.5.4)
Its first meeting, lasting two days, was given over to an
extended brainstorming session, with ideas ranging from the
"almost visionan/" to the mundane chalked up on two
blackboards. One board contained cost-cutting proposals, the
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Percy, 1976), reports (SAPTF, 1975;
Weaver, 1975) and the internal memos,
minutes, and protocols of the System
Advisory Task Force which were kindly
made available to the author by the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin administration.
Other ideas for "creative reinvestments." Only suggestions
which were patently absurd or obviously infeasible were re-
jected. The session resulted in 23 proposals for innovative
cost reduction and 16 "creative reinvestment" options.••••
At the end of this meeting, 20 alternatives clustered into
nine options were assigned to task force members for re-
view. Seven options were innovative cost reductions, only
two from the "creative reinvestment" group. This proportion
reflected a prevailing sense, implicitly reinforced by the
chairman (a senior administrator), that the latter were im-
practical under current and projected conditions. Several
ideas were also dropped because the committee did not
have the time to collect the needed data within its three-
month reporting deadline.
Now the committee also began to sense constraints on the
content of its proposals: some members of the group
started hearing "rumblings from downtown" — the Gover-
nor's office and the State Department of Administration —
implying that any ideas that were not money saving were a
waste of time.
At its next meeting, the committee discussed some options
in detail, with particular emphasis on their degree of overlap
with other committees. As a result some proposals were
transferred to other groups for elaboration and review, and
the committee decided which of the remaining alternatives
to include in its final report. These ended up in two groups:
one group of options for detailed analysis, and those in the
other to be wrapped up in short position papers.
Five items made up the first group. Three were basically
ways of restructuring incentives to reorganize the system:
limiting enrollments, reviewing external cost-per-student
ratios, and developing a capacity-funding formula. The last
had appeared in the original list of alternatives as "funding
formula modifications" and its genesis will be described in
more detail below. The other two prionty options were to
develop two models: one of the "Regional University" con-
cept and one of a campus-center consolidation.
Nine options were included in the second group, probably
because of their onerous data requirements. Several alterna-
tives, too, were dropped at this stage; some were passed to
the centra! administration for consideration, others seemed
to have limited savings potential, and one more "creative
reinvestment" option was abandoned.
A "Task Force Status Report" of Februan/ 3, identified only
the following alternatives:
— Externally imposed enrollment limits at several campuses;
— Externally imposed cost-per-student targets;
— Establishment of regional universities by consolidation of (a)
three campuses, (b) one campus and three centers;
— Development of a capacity funding concept (tied to enrollment
limits) which would establish enrollment and funding targets for
phasing down programs and institutions. (Smith, 1975: 4)
This report supports the impression that the options for po-
sition paper presentation were no longer under serious con-
sideration. The committee had achieved a considerable de-
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gree of closure in one week, as a result of its perceived
constraints. Subsequently the committee elaborated on
these options, with groups of members preparing working
papers on selected issues. One of these concepts — the
idea of targeted capacity funding — has a background which
is worth developing in more detail.
The use of a funding formula to regulate the capacity of the
University System and optimize its use of resources was not
new. The existing enrollment-funding formula, in fact, had
been one of the university's major internal incentives to
growth. When the administration perceived this in 1974, it
undertook a search for an alternative. A memo from the
SAPTF chairman criticized the existing formula and referred
to a practice he had encountered in Britain, of allocating
funds on the basis of "places."
Targeted capacity funding came to the attention of the uni-
versity system's budgeters just when their frustration at un-
successful attempts to adapt the old formula to new condi-
tions reached its peak. Tests of several other funding for-
mulas for feasibility and impacts revealed that the proposed
formula was the only viable alternative, and minimized po-
tential opposition. As a result, targeted capacity funding be-
came university policy on February 21, 1975, the first (and
so far, the only one) of the comnnittee's proposals to be
implennented.
The three-volume SAPTF Report became an appendix to the
university President's Report to the Regents, an appendix
which few, if any, of the relevant decision makers would
read. Judging from the President's Report (which, in con-
trast to the Task Force's, is short: 35 pages, compared to
hundreds of pages), the survival rate of the committee's
alternatives through the obstacle course of organizational
selection was low. Only regional coordination and resource
sharing with Wisconsin's system of Vocational and Technical
Adult Education were mentioned, and even those were re-
ferred to as options worthy of further study rather than as
items recommended for action. The "targeted capacity fund-
ing" concept was the only one of the committee's recom-
nnendations to be implemented, although some lines of in-
quiry stimulated by this group can be seen in other parts of
the Report. We cannot fail to be struck by the high number
of fatalities among the 39 alternatives generated in the
committee's first sessions.
The lack of any other discernable impacts of the whole
SAPTF process on the University of Wisconsin System may
seem surprising. The explanation may be found in the
changing relations between the university and the legisla-
ture. In the expansionist period of the 1960s the state legis-
lators coveted the university administration's power of al-
locating funds among its various campuses. When a newly
merged university system was created by statute, the ad-
ministrative review of the system was vested in the state
and its legislative committees.
Unluckily for the legislature, it "bought in," as it were, v\'hen
the market was at its high. When choices became limited to
options for retrenchment, rather than growth, the state be-
came eager to throw them back to the university administra-
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tion. In the President's Report, the university returned these
unpopular decisions to the Governor. This was a simulated
crisis which the ritual of solutions, it was felt, could avert.
The SAPTF reflected a typical use of long-range planning in
academic organizations (Cohen and March, 1974: 114-115).
So far this strategy seems to have succeeded.
The salient feature of this case is not the generation of the
alternatives themselves, though this was the explicit and
formal task of the committee. It is the process of informal
review and elimination, the "focusing" process through
which organizational constraints are brought to bear even
before any options are sufficiently elaborated for formal
evaluation.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Alternatives Design, Sources, and Outputs
Search or creation, and sources. In all three cases the
sources for policy options were largely accepted ideas within
the organizations. Each episode took place in the context of
much longer range, continuously ongoing decision making
(Mack, 1971) which provided precedent that was the source
of the bulk of alternatives proposed for evaluation.
The element of search was predominant in those instances
where a wide range of options was generated, as in the
Roskill Commission's effort, or where unconventional or in-
novative proposals emerged. This is not to say that creativity
is impossible or ineffective; it only suggests, descriptively,
that in these instances, ideas or options have been found or
recalled rather than formed or created. This is true even of
innovative recombinations, such as the targeted capacity
funding concept implemented at the University of
Wisconsin.
An obvious implication of this finding is the importance of
systematic search in the organization and its immediate en-
vironment to elicit unconventional and novel alternatives. We
will find that this is far from being a sufficient condition for
innovation, but it is clearly a necessary prerequisite.
Number, type, and range of options. In the beginning of
the process, the cases vary widely in the number, types,
and range of alternatives generated. The Roskill Commis-
sion's search netted 78 sites in every possible location, the
SAPTF committee developed 29 options, ranging from the
conventional to the visionary, and the U.S. national security
establishment repeatedly developed three or four options for
review, all only incrementally different, while sometimes an
unacceptably radical policy also waited in the wings.
Clearly, the three cases have little in common here. But
their most salient common feature is the rapid convergence
of options, both in number and in range, before the formal
evaluation process ever began. Unless they responded to an
urgently perceived need (like targeted capacity funding), the
more innovative proposals were eliminated in the process of
review. This happened in all three cases: the non-escalation
alternatives for Vietnam, the coastal sites for the third Lon-




Closure in the Decision-Making Process
The rational decision-making model calls for low closure be-
tween alternatives design and the preceding goal-articulation
or problem-definition phase, while demanding high closure
between design and evaluation. Clearly, in these three cases
we have observed something very different.
Problem-goal definition and design. In each of the cases
we can see the interaction between altematives develop-
ment and problem-goal definition. This interaction, however,
is not always clear or unambiguous. In none of the three
cases was it the ostensible goal which bounded the field of
possible alternatives, but a more limited, more concrete ob-
jective. This was sometimes set in quite a different institu-
tional context than the original goals, but it was much more
powerful in determining eventual policy.
In the Vietnam case, for example, the objective was speci-
fied by the national security establishment: to prevent Viet-
nam from falling to the communists during the term of the
incumbent administration and at minimal cost to the U.S.
While this objective determined national policy by constrain-
ing the search for acceptable solutions to the Vietnam prob-
lem, it was only relatively late in the course of events that
this goal became manifest and subject to intensive national
debate.
The Roskill Commission's goals were given in its terms of
reference, but both the Commission and its staff chose to
focus on a particular subset in setting its pnorities. Con-
.sequently, the alternatives-development and -evaluation pro-
cess undertaken by the Commission turned into a site selec-
tion process, rather than an exploration of the broader policy
options as intended by Parliament. In the Wisconsin case,
too, the study committee's actual terms of reference were
effectively more limited than its formal charge, so that the
"creative reinvestment" options were all short-lived.
In none of these cases, then, do we observe the free inter-
play between ends and means, between goal definition and
alternatives design, that is prescribed for rational decision
making. Rather, goal or problem definition was foreclosed,
and design was preempted by perceptual, ideological, or or-
ganizational considerations which became the most limiting
constraint on the ultimate range of possible solutions.
Alternatives' review and evaluation. The rational
decision-making process envisages a separate phase of al-
ternatives development, followed by a distinct stage of for-
mal evaluation and selection. What appears in each of these
cases is something quite different: a review and selection
process in the context of alternatives' development, which
is quite distinct from, and often largely preempts, the sys-
tematic evaluation process.
This review process consisted of the elimination of alterna-
tives from further consideration and later evaluation by ap-
plying criteria (of differing degrees of formalization) which
are the result of intuitively perceived and nonformalized con-
straints. This informal review process is distinct from formal
evaluation, it was applied before any of the alternatives
were elaborated to any extent which would enable formal
evaluation of their prospective impacts or outcomes.
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As a result, review becomes inextricably interlinked with de-
sign. Only those options were designed which survived a
process of blending or elimination. Blending is apparent
when more "extreme" options are subtly changed to narrow
the range of alternatives into the domain of the acceptable,
as happened repeatedly in Vietnam policy reviews. Elimina-
tion is observed when some options are dropped while
others are retained for elaboration, a process consciously
applied by the Roskill Commission. The University of Wis-
consin Task Force identified the surviving alternatives by a
process which combined both blending and elimination.
A number of factors account for the constraints which form
the review process, including characteristics of the
decision-making process itself. Because the decision pro-
cess commands limited time and resources, easily applied
criteria without cumbersome data needs or complex
judgmental demands get more weight. Clear examples are
the surface-access criterion applied by the Roskill Commis-
sion, and the elimination or downplaying of options requiring
extensive data, by the Wisconsin SAPTF.
In some of the cases, alternatives were eliminated almost
intuitively, applying informal selection criteria. Some critena
related to the character and perceptions of the participants,
others reflected strongly held organizational paradigms or
were a response to intuitively perceived organizational or en-
vironmental constraints. For example, in the evolution of
Vietnam policy, non-escalation alternatives were dismissed
without formal evaluation by a ngid application of the
"domino theory," the dominant ideological paradigm in the
U.S. policy establishment. In selecting an airport site, the
quantitative propensities of the Roskill Commission's staff
led to an undervaluing of factors requinng judgmental, rather
than purely analytic, decisions. And in the case of the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin study committee, perceived system
demands — an emphasis on cost saving and the apparent
infeasibility of any non-saving options — led to the early
elimination of the "creative reinvestments."
As a result of these factors we do not observe a process of
uninhibited alternatives development generating a broad
range of options for formal evaluation. Rather, we have dis-
covered an intuitive, informal, or semiformalized evaluation
process which occurs before formal evaluation even begins.
Unlike formal evaluation techniques, this process is not
based on a formal tradeoff of weighted criteria, but is more
a series of decisions based on a single important value. In
this sense, it demonstrates an infusion of what Steinbruner
(1974) has called the "cybernetic" decision process into
even the most designedly rational and analytic organizational
choices. The review of alternatives, then, seems to be an
integral part of their development, and an indispensable
"focusing" process which narrows down the range of op-
tions long before they are forwarded for systematic
evaluation.
An Analytic Model
The systematic companson of these cases uses an analytic
model which is based on the dimensions of the design pro-




The combination of high creativity and
passive search seems so unlikely that it
has been treated as an empty set.
two Stages, since the categories that were proposed earlier
are all nominal, and subsume several components. Two
hypotheses informed the research agenda, one concerning
the relations between the creativity-search mix and the
other relating the type of closure of the alternatives-design
process and its decision outcomes. Now the components of
each of these dimensions will be explored to develop a
framework for the ordinal companson of our cases.
Creativity-search. The interest displayed in creativity and in
search approaches to problem solving has been based on
the assumption that more or superior types of creativity and
search will produce better options. The hypothesis here,
then, is that wider ranges of alternatives, and more innova-
tive options, will result from higher types of search and
creativity.
To test this hypothesis I disaggregated the creativity-search
mix dimension into its components as shown in Figure 2
below. One component is the degree and quality of creativ-
ity displayed in a design process that is articulated for con-
venience into a dichotomy of "high" and "low." The other
is the type of search, ranked from systematic search
through heuristic search to "passive" search or precedent
retrieval. Cells a through e represent a range of possible
creativity-search combinations. On the basis of the above
hypothesis, we can rank them in terms of their likelihood to
elicit a broad and innovative range of alternatives.
As suggested by the analysis of its search-creativity mix, the
Roskill Commission displays a combination of low creativity













UWS: University of Wisconsin System
Alternatives innovation range ranking: a>b—c>d>e.'*
Figure 2. The creativity-search mix dimension.
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and no creative processes were deliberately encouraged) and
systematic search. The University of Wisconsin's study
committee applied a mixture of high creativity (brainstorm-
ing) and heuristic search, while Vietnam policy options were
all retrieved from precedent in a process where passive
search predominated.
Closure. Figure 3 below is a more formal presentation of
the closure dimension. This presentation enables us to ex-
plore the relations between variations in closure and differ-
ent types of constrained alternatives design.
The four cells that result from an arbitrary dichotomy be-
tween high and low closure on each of the interfaces of
alternatives design can be ranked in terms of the degree to
which we would expect closure to preempt the uninhibited
design of alternatives. We find the ideal "rational" type (1)
the highest: it ensures the most open decision process and
limits preempting by either political or ideological factors
predetermining problem or goal formulations or the same
factors constituting the parameters of preformal evaluation
and alternatives elimination. Alternating evaluation with de-
sign in an iterative integrated process (2) is only slightly in-
ferior to this ideal, but does involve the risk that preliminary,
though formalized, evaluation criteria may lead to the prema-
ture elimination of an optimal option.
Of the four types shown here, "limited design" (3) and'
"preformal elimination" (4) display dysfunctional types of
closure: the first, high closure on the interface with goal-
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Figure 3. The closure dimension.
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evaluation stage. Consequently, both are likely to be as-
sociated with a high degree of preemption. Figure 3 below
shows the Roskill Commission adopting a deliberate inte-
grated evaluation process, while both the Vietnam policy
makers and the University of Wisconsin task force combined
limited design and preformal elimination in differing degrees.
Range and innovativeness of alternatives. Figure 4 below
shows how quality of the alternatives-design process is a
function of two competing factors, which may affect the
range and innovativeness of the options which emerge. The
type and mix of search and creativity tends to enhance the
generation of alternatives, and the degree of preemption
brought about by the type and degree of closure will inhibit
the design process.
The cases analyzed here offer some support to these
hypotheses, though the differences among them are not,
perhaps, so great as might have been supposed on the
basis of theory. Both the Roskill Commission and the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin SAPTF developed a large number of
options, while the number of alternatives under considera-
tion for Vietnam policy never exceeded four. The first two
groups also developed some innovative proposals in the de-
sign stage, innovative in the sense that they differed signifi-
cantly from other ideas current in the same organizational
contexts.
But when discussing the range and types of alternatives, we
must distinguish between the repertoire of options which
emerge during the design process and the set of alterna-
tives that are ultimately evaluated. In all our cases, these













generation ^ ^ p . Vietnam Policy
ROS: Roskill Commission
UWS: University of Wisconsin System
Figure 4. Analysis of the alternatives design process.
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that limits which alternative may be chosen for implementa-
tion, and thus determines decision outcomes.
Relation to Outcomes
In these three cases, alternatives were generated primarily
through a process of search and discovery, rather than crea-
tion or invention. It is too speculative to suppose that
another process might have resulted in a significantly differ-
ent range of options. Although the search process itself
must have an effect, the initial process of alternatives de-
sign yielded a wide range of options, so this phase cannot
account for the quality of the ultimate choices.
It is the range and quality of the options that emerged from
informal review in the design process that had a powerful
effect on outcomes in each of the three cases. In the Viet-
nam policy-making case, the options which were formally
evaluated were repeatedly so similar that their convergence
was inevitable. The selection of an inland site by the Roskill
Commission was a foregone conclusion, in the view of in-
formed observers, before the final evaluation process ever
began. And in the Wisconsin case, only a limited range of
cost-saving options remained for more extended analysis
and inclusion in the President's Report.
We can only speculate on the substitution relationship be-
tween alternatives genesis through creativity and search on
the one hand, and the preemption of alternatives design by
closure of the decision-making process on the other. But in
the cases analyzed here, the process of limiting alternatives
by inhibiting their design, by "blending" options, and by their
early informal elimination, seems to be the most powerful
factor in deciding which options were evaluated, and in af-
fecting the ultimate outcomes. Indeed, we cannot avoid the
conclusion that in all three cases outcomes were even more
affected by this process than by the subsequent stage of
formal evaluation itself.
If this conclusion is true for a wider range of organizational
decision making than can be generalized from this limited
sample, the normative implications would be profound.
Perhaps all the efforts which are devoted to refining evalua-
tive methods and to applying ever more sophisticated tech-
niques of evalu.^tive analysis are misdirected. If the choices
which determine outcomes in organizational contexts are
made informally and intuitively before the evaluation phase
begins, then attempts at formalizing and rationalizing evalua-
tion, however praiseworthy, are made in vain.
The process of alternatives development in organizational
contexts warrants further study. Even this limited analysis,
however, suggests that alternatives design is a stage in the
decision process whose neglect is unjustified in terms of its
possible effect on decision outcomes. The investigation into
design methods, and the development of simple, almost in-
tuitively applicable methods of comparison and evaluation,
could make a significant contribution toward improving the
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